| 我国信贷市场的进化与调控 |
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| 引用本文： | 易余胤,肖条军.我国信贷市场的进化与调控[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2003,33(4):483-486. |
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| 作者姓名： | 易余胤 肖条军 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京大学管理科学与工程研究院,南京,210093 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 1710 2 8) |
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| 摘 要： | 首先在无约束的市场条件下建立了一个进化博弈模型说明信贷市场的基本进化规律,并通过对模型参数的分析来说明达到良好市场行为的策略和方法．然后,通过加入法律监督并对逃避还贷的企业予以处罚等市场约束条件对模型进行改进并做出分析,说明在创造良好的市场环境和退出“闭锁”的过程中,政府干预十分重要．最后,对如何形成良好的市场行为规范给出了一些有益的结论及建议．
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| 关 键 词： | 进化博弈 信息不完备 信贷市场 市场行为规范 进化规律 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-0505(2003)04-0483-04 |
Evolution and control of credit market of China |
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| Yi Yuyin,Xiao Tiaojun.Evolution and control of credit market of China[J].Journal of Southeast University(Natural Science Edition),2003,33(4):483-486. |
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| Authors: | Yi Yuyin Xiao Tiaojun |
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| Abstract: | An evolutionary game model is constructed to study the basic evolution law of the credit market with no restriction. How to reach good market behavior is illustrated by analyzing and controlling model parameters. Then the model is improved by adding some restrictions such as law to show that government plays an important role in forming good market environment and exiting the "lock in". Finally, some beneficial results and suggestions about how to standardize credit market behavior are given. |
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| Keywords: | evolutionary game imperfect information credit market |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
