| 人力资本投资失衡的进化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 谢文昕,周亚,李克强. 人力资本投资失衡的进化博弈分析[J]. 北京师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2007, 43(2): 209-212 |
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| 作者姓名： | 谢文昕 周亚 李克强 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京师范大学系统科学系,100875,北京 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部科学技术研究项目，北京市教育科学规划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 指出我国目前存在人力资本投资失衡问题,并运用进化博弈的分析方法,构建了对称状态下的模仿者动态方程;认为个体采用高学历和低学历两种策略,得出了复制动态下的3个均衡解.结论表明我国劳动者以较高的概率选择高学历,而高技术岗位的增长无法与高学历的增长相匹配,从而导致了人才浪费.
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| 关 键 词： | 人力资本 进化博弈 复制动态 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-09-30 |
EVOLUTION GAME ANALYSIS OF THE UNBALANCE IN HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT |
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| Xie Wenxin,Zhou Ya,Li Keqiang. EVOLUTION GAME ANALYSIS OF THE UNBALANCE IN HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT[J]. Journal of Beijing Normal University(Natural Science), 2007, 43(2): 209-212 |
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| Authors: | Xie Wenxin Zhou Ya Li Keqiang |
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| Affiliation: | Department of System Science, Beijing Normal University, 100875, Beijing, China |
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| Abstract: | The human capital investment in China is unbalance.The imitator dynamic equation is built under the symmetry state referring to the theoretical method of the evolution game theory.The individual adopts two educational background strategies: high or low.It leads to three balanced solution under a replication dynamic state.The conclusion shows that Chinese labors get a high rate choosing the high educational background,but the growth of number of the high tech position cannot match with the high educational background,thus causing talented labor waste. |
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| Keywords: | human capital evolution game replication dynamics |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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