信贷数量管制与利率市场化的挤出效应——基于2013年贷款利率下限放开的准自然实验

在推进贷款利率的市场化时中国中央银行对信贷数量仍然保留管制，研究在信贷数量管制条件下放开贷款利率管制是否对民营企业融资行为产生挤出效应有助于科学评估贷款利率放开的微观经济效应。基于2013年贷款利率下限放开的准自然实验研究发现，由于信贷数量管制的存在，具有政府隐性担保的国有企业融资便利效应在贷款利率下限放开以后进一步放大，从而对民营企业的信贷融资行为产生挤出效应，致使民营企业与国有企业杠杆率不断分化，且以上挤出效应在市场化进程较低、政府融资越多的地区更显著。由于非正式金融的再配置效应，贷款利率下限放开对民营企业正式融资行为的抑制作用主要对资本投资形成产生挤出效应，对研发投资没有产生显著的挤出效应。这说明，在不改变信贷数量管制的前提下单一取消资本价格管制可能难以达到预期的积极。

Credit Quantity Control and Crowding Out Effect of Interest Rate Liberalization: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on Deregulation of the Lower Limit of Loan Interest Rate in 2013

In the process of marketization of loan interest rates, the Central Bank still retains control on the amount of credit. Under the background of the amount of credit control, studying whether the deregulation of loan interest rate has a crowding-out effect on the financing behavior of private enterprises is helpful to scientifically evaluate the microeconomic effect of deregulating the lower limit of loan interest rate. The study based on the quasi-natural experimental of deregulating the lower limit of loan interest rates in 2013 indicates that due to the existence of control on the amount of credit, the financing facilitation of state-owned enterprises with implicit government guarantees has been further amplified after the lower limit of loan interest rates is liberalized, thereby restraining private enterprises from credit financing, resulting in the continuous differentiation of the leverage ratio of private enterprises and state-owned enterprises. The above-mentioned restraining effect is more pronounced in regions with a lower degree of marketization and more government financing. Due to the re-allocation effect of informal finance, the restraining effect of deregulating the lower limit of loan interest rates on the formal financing behavior of private enterprises mainly cause a significant crowding-out effect on capital investment but does not cause a significant crowding-out effect on research and development investment. This shows that the cancellation of capital price controls on the premise of not changing the control on the amount of credit has not achieved the expected positive effect.