我国互联网监管体系利益相关方行为博弈分析

采用博弈理论和方法对我国互联网监管体系中各方行为进行了分析,发现监管动机来源于博弈方风险厌恶的倾向,两级委托-代理模型使得具体执行监管工作的互联网机构处于收益小、成本高、风险大的境地,而位于中间位置的行政机构则处于信息最优势的地位;同时,由于逆向选择,网民在网络意见市场里倾向于选择不相信监管方的判断;而学术研究机构更多地在为自身谋求有利的代理地位,而非进行政策效果反馈工作。

Analysis on the Behavioral Game of Stakeholders in China＇s Internet Regulatory System

By using the game theory and method, this paper analyzes the behaviors of all parties in China＇s Internet regulatory system, and finds that the supervision motivation comes from the game parties＇ risk aversion tendency, and the two-level principal-agent model makes the Internet institutions performing the supervision work be in a very difficult position with small profit, high cost and big risk, and the the administrative institutions located in the middle position possesses the most advantageous information; at the same time, because of the adverse selection, the netizens tend to choose the judgment of disbelieving the regulators in network opinion market; and the academic research institutions are paying more attention to seeking favorable agent status for their own rather than the policy effect feedback.