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考虑长期合同的发电市场竞价机制设计
引用本文:邹小燕,任玉珑.考虑长期合同的发电市场竞价机制设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(8):118-126.
作者姓名:邹小燕  任玉珑
作者单位:1. 重庆师范大学,经济与管理学院重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400047
2. 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400047
摘    要:发电市场中发电公司可能利用其成本信息优势抬高报价从而降低市场效率,应该设计合理的竞价机制鼓励发电公司揭示其真实成本信息.文章在发电成本函数为二次函数的情况下,考虑电力长期合同对现货市场的影响,设计一种激励相容的发电市场新竞价机制,该机制通过给予发电公司合理的信息补偿,使其揭示真实发电成本,从而实现发电市场的经济配置.最后以IEEE-RTS96的数据为基础,对所设计的新机制进行仿真分析,结果表明与现有的MCP机制和PAB机制相比,新机制可以通过揭示发电公司的真实发电成本而提高发电市场的经济效率.

关 键 词:长期合同  发电市场  竞价机制  激励相容
文章编号:1000-6788(2007)08-0118-09
修稿时间:2006年4月17日

The Electricity Auction Mechanism Design in Generation Market Considering the Long-term Contract
ZOU Xiao-yan,REN Yu-long.The Electricity Auction Mechanism Design in Generation Market Considering the Long-term Contract[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2007,27(8):118-126.
Authors:ZOU Xiao-yan  REN Yu-long
Abstract:In electricity generation market,generation companies with costs information advantage will bid higher than their real costs,and this may reduce the market efficiency,so we should design a reasonable auction mechanism which can encourage the generation companies to reveal their real costs.Based on this target,the paper designs an incentive auction mechanism considering the long-term contract and the cost conic curve.The new mechanism can make the generation companies reveal their real costs through appropriate cost compensate,and it can realize the electricity distribution efficiency.Then makes a demonstration based on the data from IEEE-RTS96.The result shows that the new mechanism is incentive compatible compared with the exited mechanisms such as MCP or PAB,and it can enhance the efficiency of the electricity generation market.
Keywords:long-term contract  electricity generation market  auction mechanism  incentive compatibility
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