地方政府研发补贴的区域竞争

通过构建中央政府干预的地方政府研发补贴区域竞争模型,运用空间面板方法基于中国31个省级地区2009-2015年的数据,分析地方政府在企业研发补贴上的区域竞争模式.研究发现,地方政府对国有企业的研发补贴呈现负的空间效应,地方政府采取相互替代的竞争策略,财政分权度系数显著为负说明国有企业所从事的基础性、全局性研发活动具有较大的外部性,地方政府对国有企业的研发补贴主要依靠中央政府的引导和支持,地方政府在国有企业研发补贴上的竞争实质上是对中央政府转移支付的竞争.对非国有企业的研发补贴则呈现正的空间效应,地方政府为了吸引和留住以市场为导向、流动性强的非国有创新企业采取相互模仿的竞争策略.研究结果表明,中央政府主导下的地方政府区域竞争会根据经济发展方式的变化而不断调整,竞争的对象向创新要素转移,充分体现了中国的制度优势以及市场在创新资源配置中的决定性作用.

Regional competition of local government R&D subsidies

By building a regional competition model for R&D subsidies from local governments under the intervention of central government, this paper analyzes the regional competition mode for the R&D subsidies from local governments to the enterprise based on the data of Chinese 31 provincial regions during 2009-2015, by using spatial panel model. This study finds that the spatial effect of R&D subsidies from local government to state-owned enterprises is negative, local governments adopt mutually substitution competitive strategy, the significant negative coefficient of fiscal decentralization shows the great externality of the basic and global R&D activity in SOE, the R&D subsidies from local government to SOE mainly rely on the guidance and support from central government, the regional competition for R&D subsidies from local governments to SOE is a competition for the transfer payment of central government in essence. The spatial effect of R&D subsidies from local government to non-SOE is positive, in order to attract and retain the non-state-owned innovative enterprises who are market-oriented and full of strong mobility. The result shows that the local government competition guided by central government, which will be self-adjustment due to the transfer of economic development pattern as the competing object is changing to innovative factors, highly demonstrates China's institutional advantages and the decisive role of market in the allocation of innovative resources.