代理人公平偏好下的长短期业绩目标与薪酬激励契约研究

以薪酬激励合约为中介,通过植入代理人公平偏好的异质性,构建代理人长短期业绩目标的多任务委托代理模型.基于该模型探究了代理人最优:在公平偏好下,代理人风险厌恶程度越强,委托人给予代理人最优长短期激励薪酬越少,固定薪酬与总体薪酬越多;代理人能力、公平偏好对最优长短期薪酬激励契约的影响与代理人风险偏好类型相关;代理人公平偏好程度及最优长短期薪酬激励强度对固定薪酬及总体薪酬的影响取决于各任务间的相关系数.

Research on long-term and short-term performance task and agent's compensation incentive based on fairness preference

Based on the compensation incentive contract, this paper constructs the long-term and short-term task principal-agent model under condition of the heterogeneity of fairness preference. The optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation contract was studied, and the effect of the optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation contract on the agent's fairness preference and risk preference was investigated. The result shows that under the fairness preference, the stronger the degree of the agent's risk aversion is, the weaker the intensity of the agent's compensation incentive from the principal is, and the more the fixed compensation and the total compensation is; the degree of the influence of the agent's ability and fairness preference on the optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation contract depends on the type of the agent's risk appetite; the intensity of the effect of the fixed compensation and total compensation on the agent's fairness preference and the optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation is related to the correlation between the multi-tasks.