EVA考核,研发费用管理与央企创新效率

以2009年实施EVA(economic value added)考核这一事件为契机,基于研发费用管理视角考察EVA考核对央企创新效率的影响路径.通过双重差分模型和超越对数面板随机前沿模型实证研究后发现,实施EVA考核显著提高央企的研发费用正向管理水平,且通过研发费用正向管理这一中间渠道能提高央企创新效率,意味着EVA考核能够在一定程度上缓解央企创新方面委托代理矛盾.在进一步研究中,以"微利"或"微增"央企为切入点,发现高管进行研发费用正向管理时会兼顾企业利润总额,其目的仅是为了获取更高考核值.因此,EVA考核的激励作用是有限的.

EVA assessment,R&D management and innovation efficiency of central government-owned enterprises (CGOEs)

Taking the event of implementing economic value added (EVA) assessment in 2009 as an opportunity, the impact of EVA assessment on the innovation efficiency of central government-owned enterprises (CGOEs) was investigated based on the perspective of research and development (R&D) management. By difference-in-differences model and beyond logarithmic panel stochastic frontier model, the study reveals that implementing the EVA assessment significantly increased the level of R&D management of CGOEs, and the innovation efficiency of the CGOEs was increased through the intermediate channel of positive R&D management, which means that the EVA assessment can alleviate the entrusted agency conflict in the innovation of CGOEs to a certain extent. In the further study, the paper takes "meager profits" and "meager increases" of CGOEs as the breakthrough point, and finds that executives will take into account the total profits of enterprises when conducting positive R&D management. The purpose of executives is only to obtain higher evaluation value. Therefore, the incentive effect of the EVA assessment is limited.