电子监控状态下的薪酬配置与代理人行为分析

智能制造背景下，企业控制正在逐渐由传统人工监控向电子监控转变，如何将电子监控与信息化深度融合，形成有效激励机制是亟待解决的问题。基于委托代理理论隐藏行动道德风险模型的研究成果，提出电子监控的信息处理思路，将电子监控获得的信息加入薪酬契约，分析了绩效薪酬的构成比例，和代理人行为的变化趋势。通过最优的薪酬激励，实现代理人工资和委托人效用共同增长的双赢效应。从管理理论角度，扩展了委托代理理论中隐藏行动道德风险模型，明确了信息在激励机制中的作用；从生产实践角度，完善薪酬契约的配置问题，为企业的激励机制和电子监控的信息应用提供实践帮助。

Remuneration Mechanism and Analysis of Agent Behavior Under Electronic Surveillance #br#

Under the background of intelligent manufacturing, enterprise control is gradually changing from the traditional manual surveillance to intelligent surveillance. Therefore, the integration of electronic surveillance with information technology to form an effective incentive mechanism has become a serious problem to be solved. Based on the moral hazard model with hidden actions, which is part of the principal-agent theory, the information acquired by the electronic surveillance system is added to the remuneration incentive system, and the remuneration configuration and agents’ behavior under different information situation are analyzed. Through the optimal remuneration incentive, the win-win effect of the joint growth of agents’ salary and principal utility is realized. From the perspective of management theory, the moral hazard model with hidden actions in the principal-agent theory, especially the role of information in incentive mechanism is enriched. From the perspective of enterprise practices, the configuration of remuneration contract under different information situations is defined. The conclusion provides practical guidance for enterprise incentive mechanism and information application from electronic surveillance.