多归属P2P网贷平台定价及盈利模式分析:一个两阶段动态博弈模型

本文结合P2P网贷平台的特点,建立了一个基于双边市场定价理论的两阶段动态博弈模型,用来研究P2P平台的不同商业模式,特别是盈利模式.为揭示在我国金融环境下以P2P为代表的新型金融产品的持续经营条件与未来发展方向,结合我国新出台的P2P相关政策,在模型中考虑政策影响,理论研究结果表明:1)在二部制收费和只收会员费的两种不同盈利模式下,网络外部性均会使多归属P2P平台的利润降低;2)二部制收费的盈利模式优于只收取会员费的盈利模式;3)现有P2P相关政策对保证本金(利息)模式的明令禁止将更好的保障出借人的利益.基于所得结论,最后提出若干关于我国P2P平台发展及监管的政策建议.

The analysis of multi-homing P2P lending platforms' profit model and pricing problem: A two-stage dynamic game model

Based on the traditional two-sided market theory and the characteristics of P2P lending platforms, this paper proposes a two-stage game model to analyse different business models, especially profit models of P2P lending platforms. With the purpose of showing the continuous operating condition and developing direction of P2P lending platforms under the financial environment in China, this paper takes China's new policies about P2P into consideration, takes account of impact of policy and finds the following results:1) under the scenario in which P2P platform charges subscription fee + transaction fee or subscription fee only, network externalities reduces the P2P platforms' profit when lenders are multihoming; 2) adopting the profit model of subscription fee + transaction fee makes a higher profit than the profit model of subscription fee only; 3) the prohibition in existing policies of P2P lending platforms on principal guaranteed model will protect the interests of lenders. Finally, this paper puts forward policy suggestions of the P2P lending platforms in China.