| 证券市场虚假信号传递博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 幸昆仑,杨剑侠. 证券市场虚假信号传递博弈[J]. 重庆大学学报(自然科学版), 2004, 27(1): 156-160 |
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| 作者姓名： | 幸昆仑 杨剑侠 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,工商管理学院,重庆,400030;重庆大学,工商管理学院,重庆,400030 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金 , 重庆市应用基础研究基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于信息不对称,建立了一个证券市场虚假信号传递博弈模型,从以衍生金融市场为"误导"工具的角度对股市羊群行为的产生机理进行了阐释,得出了普通投资者证券市场的分离均衡结论.进而,对中国证券市场发展及我国衍生金融市场的开放与发展提供了政策参考.
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| 关 键 词： | 羊群行为 信息不对称 虚假信号传递博弈 证券市场有效性 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-582X(2004)01-0156-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003-09-22 |
False-Signaling Game in Security Market |
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| XING Kun-lun,YANG Jian-xia. False-Signaling Game in Security Market[J]. Journal of Chongqing University(Natural Science Edition), 2004, 27(1): 156-160 |
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| Authors: | XING Kun-lun YANG Jian-xia |
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| Abstract: | Based on informational asymmetry,this article builds up a false-signaling game model in security market.The game model illuminates the mechanism of Herd Behavior in the stock market by a way in which the more-informed investor cheats the less-informed investor through the derivative financial market .Meanwhile,it makes a conclusion of separating equilibrium for common investors'security investment.Finally,the article gives some policies for reference for both the development of Chinese security market and the opening as well as development of Chinese derivative financial market. |
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| Keywords: | herd behavior informational asymmetry false-signaling game the efficiency of security market |
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