工程安全双重监管博弈演化的波动效应与机制优化研究

为了完善当前工程施工的安全治理机制,本研究针对工程施工中各参与方的安全行为演化过程,构建了施工、监理和安监3方的动态监管博弈模型,并运用Matlab数值仿真技术,探索了当前普遍采用的工程安全双重监管机制的演化规律及其影响因素。研究表明：影响因素存在于“波动区间”,区间内社会综合效益表现出两类波动形态,其原因在于博弈方的交互关系及复制动态方程特点;双重监管与单一监管相比仅能小幅提高社会综合效益,且无助于控制波动效应;提高相关方安全责任会促使其重视安全,责任全部由施工方承担时社会综合效益最高;增加风险预期、查处概率、处罚力度及降低合规操作和监管成本均有助于提高社会综合效益。

Research on the Volatility Effect and Mechanism Optimization of the Game Evolution of Dual Supervision of Engineering Safety

In order to improve the safety management mechanism of current engineering construction, this study focused on the evolution process of safety behavior of each participant in the construction, and constructed a dynamic supervision game model of construction enterprises, supervision enterprises and safety bureau. Then the Matlab numerical simulation technology was used to explore the evolution law of the currently widely adopted dual supervision mechanism for engineering safety and the influencing factors. The results show that the influencing factors exist in the "fluctuation ranges", in which the comprehensive social benefits show two types of wave patterns and the reason is from the interactive relationship of game players and the characteristics of replicator dynamic equations. Besides, compared with single supervision, dual supervision can only slightly improve the comprehensive social benefits, and does not help control the volatility effect. Moreover, improving the safety responsibility of relevant parties will encourage them to attach importance to safety, and the comprehensive social benefits will be the highest when the responsibility is all borne by the construction enterprises. Furthermore, increasing risk expectation, investigation probability as well as penalties and reducing the cost of compliance operation and supervision all contribute to improve the comprehensive social benefits.