高管薪酬激励与企业研发投入 ——带有管理层约束的实证检验

企业发展离不开公司内部的创新能力，如何降低市场风险来推动企业发展是实业界面临的一个重要问题。基于管理层短视的视角，采用国泰安研究数据库中A股制造业上市公司的数据实证检验了高管薪酬激励对企业研发投入的影响。研究表明，高管薪酬激励对企业研发投入起显著的促进作用；管理层持股和长期负债水平会正反两层面影响高管薪酬激励与研发投入的关系。研究结论从企业角度揭示了高管薪酬激励对创新投入的内在影响，对加速企业发展有一定的现实意义。

Executive Compensation Incentive and Firm R&D Investment: An Empirical Test with Management Constraints

Enterprise development is inseparable from the company''s internal innovation capabilities. How to reduce market risks to promote enterprise development is an important issue facing the industry. Based on the perspective of management''s short-sightedness, the data of A-share manufacturing listed companies in the Guotaian research database is used to empirically test the impact of executive compensation incentives on corporate R&D investment. Studies have shown that executive compensation incentives play a significant role in promoting R&D investment in enterprises; management''s shareholding and long-term debt level will affect the relationship between executive compensation incentives and R&D investment on both positive and negative levels. The research conclusion reveals the internal impact of executive compensation incentives on innovation investment from the perspective of enterprises, which has certain practical significance for accelerating enterprise development.