| 基于解聘补偿的双边道德风险缓解机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 张红波,王国顺.基于解聘补偿的双边道德风险缓解机制[J].系统工程,2006,24(11):90-93. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张红波 王国顺 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南大学,商学院,湖南,长沙,410083 |
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| 摘 要： | 建立基于解聘补偿的委托代理模型，研究了在初始契约中引入解聘补偿后委托代理双方的最优决策，展开分析了影响委托人解聘倾向和代理人努力程度的各种因素。研究结果表明：在初始契约中写进解聘补偿可有效缓解委托代理双方的道德风险。
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| 关 键 词： | 解聘补偿 解聘倾向 委托代理 模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-4098（2006）11-0090-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-12-20 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-12-202006-04-10 |
Mechanism to Relieve Double Moral Hazard Based on Compensate for Dismiss |
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| ZHANG Hong-bo,WANG Guo-shun.Mechanism to Relieve Double Moral Hazard Based on Compensate for Dismiss[J].Systems Engineering,2006,24(11):90-93. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Hong-bo WANG Guo-shun |
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| Institution: | School of Business, Central South University,Changsha 410083,China |
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| Abstract: | This paper set up the principal-agent model based on compensate for dismiss,studied the optimal decisions both of principal and agent under the condition to put the compensate for dismiss into initial contract and analyzed the aspects to cause the principal's dismissal liability and the agent's effort extensively.The result of study indicate it can relieve the moral hazard both of principal and agent. |
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| Keywords: | Compensate for Dismiss Dismissal Liability Principal-agent Model |
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