首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

低回收价值高环境影响EOL产品闭环供应链再利用主体行为决策分析
引用本文:程东波,霍佳震. 低回收价值高环境影响EOL产品闭环供应链再利用主体行为决策分析[J]. 同济大学学报(自然科学版), 2017, 45(9): 1399-1406
作者姓名:程东波  霍佳震
作者单位:同济大学,同济大学
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71532015)
摘    要:以低回收价值高环境影响(LCV-HEI)末端(EOL)产品回收再利用为目的,在LCV-HEI类EOL产品闭环供应链模型运行机制分析的基础上,通过构建演化博弈模型,研究了原始制造商(OEM)和EOL处置中心群体在市场机制下的长期演化特征,分析了两个群体在演化过程中的策略选择及稳定均衡点。研究结果表明,需要将OEM再制品价格控制在合理区间。此时,(回收,再利用)策略才成为EOL处置中心与OEM群体的唯一策略,这更有利于促进EOL产品的回收及再利用。并且OEM选择再利用策略,不管利润如何,政府对单位产品补贴满足一定条件,可以促进两个群体演化形成唯一均衡点(1,1)。

关 键 词:闭环供应链  低回收价值高环境影响末端产品  再利用主体  演化博弈
收稿时间:2017-01-12
修稿时间:2017-06-27

Analyze on Reusing Subject decision-making behavior of LCV-HEI class EOL products closed-loop supply chain
Abstract:This paper takes recycling of Low Commercial Value High Environmental Impact (LCV-HEI) class EOL products as purpose; we put forward an evolutionary game model based on recycling EOL products and give an analysis about the operation mechanism of Closed-loop Supply Chain model for LCV- HEI class EOL products. We study the long-term evolution characteristics of OEM and EOL disposal center population under market mechanism; we analyze the strategy selection and stable equilibrium point of the two groups in the evolution process. The results reveal that OEM remanufacturing prices need to be controlled in a reasonable range. At this point, using (recycling, reuse) strategy become the only strategy to the EOL disposal center and OEM groups, which is more conducive to promote the EOL product recycling and reuse. And OEM group choose reuse strategies, no matter how the profits, the unit of government subsidies meet certain conditions, it can promote the evolution of the groups to form the only equilibrium point (1,1).
Keywords:Closed-loop supply chain   Low Commercial Value High Environmental Impact class EOL products   Subject of recycling   Evolutionary Game
点击此处可从《同济大学学报(自然科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《同济大学学报(自然科学版)》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号