Chance,determinism and the classical theory of probability |
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Authors: | Anubav Vasudevan |
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Affiliation: | 1. Spine Program, Division of Neurosurgery, Toronto Western Hospital, Toronto, Ontario, Canada;2. Department of Clinical Neurosciences and Hotchkiss Brain Institute, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada |
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Abstract: | This paper situates the metaphysical antinomy between chance and determinism in the historical context of some of the earliest developments in the mathematical theory of probability. Since Hacking's seminal work on the subject, it has been a widely held view that the classical theorists of probability were guilty of an unwitting equivocation between a subjective, or epistemic, interpretation of probability, on the one hand, and an objective, or statistical, interpretation, on the other. While there is some truth to this account, I argue that the tension at the heart of the classical theory of probability is not best understood in terms of the duality between subjective and objective interpretations of probability. Rather, the apparent paradox of chance and determinism, when viewed through the lens of the classical theory of probability, manifests itself in a much deeper ambivalence on the part of the classical probabilists as to the rational commensurability of causal and probabilistic reasoning. |
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Keywords: | Chance Determinism Probability Principle of sufficient reason |
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