交通瓶颈处大、小型车插队行为的演化分析

调查了太原市某路段交通瓶颈处驾驶员的插队行为,分析了大、小型车驾驶员在形成插队行为中不同的心理博弈过程,建立了驾驶员排队与插队的决策博弈模型。应用演化博弈论分析了驾驶员选择排队或者插队策略的时间演化过程,建立了系统的复制动态方程并对演化稳定状态进行了分析。分析结果表明:大型车驾驶员和小型车驾驶员群体的博弈过程属于非对称性博弈,通过提高交通监管力度、增加排队的收益、提高驾驶员素质和减小排队支出的额外成本可使驾驶员采取稳定的排队策略,缓解交通拥堵。

Evolutionary Analysis on Queue-jumping of Small or Large Vehicle Drivers at Traffic Bottleneck

This paper investigates the queue-jumping driving behaviors on the road in Taiyuan, analyzes the psycho- logical game process of small and large vehicles＇ drivers in the formation of queue-jumping behavior,and the deci- sion-making model of queuing and queue-jumping of drivers at traffic bottleneck is proposed. The evolutionary process that drivers choose strategies of queuing and queue-jumping is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory. A duplicative dynamic equation is established and evolutionary stable state is analyzed. The analysis results show that the game process of small or large vehicle driver group belongs to the asymmetric game, and the driver group to steady queuing strategy relies on the enhancement of traffic regulation, the income increment of the line, the im- provement of the quality of the ＆rivers and the low additional cost of spending in line.