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基于信息甄别的预订货策略研究
引用本文:蒋龙珠.基于信息甄别的预订货策略研究[J].科学技术与工程,2012,12(8):1852-1858.
作者姓名:蒋龙珠
作者单位:1. 上海交通大学中美物流研究院,上海,200030
2. 上海交通大学,上海,200240
摘    要:以一个制造商一个经销商组成的二级供应链为研究对象,在信息不对称条件下从制造商的角度,基于信息经济学理论建立了供应链的利润函数的信息甄别解析模型,提出了预订货激励契约,对其有效原因进行了分析并解释了契约关键参数的意义,得出了制造商的最优产量决策机制。结论表明:在信息不对称条件下,制造商可利用预订货价改变经销商的利润函数结构,通过信息甄别机制对经销商的预订购量进行判断以获得真实的市场需求信息。

关 键 词:信息甄别  预订货策略  供应链协作  决策机制
收稿时间:2011/12/27 0:00:00
修稿时间:1/6/2012 11:30:11 AM

The application of information screening in Early Order Commitment
jianglongzhu.The application of information screening in Early Order Commitment[J].Science Technology and Engineering,2012,12(8):1852-1858.
Authors:jianglongzhu
Institution:2 (Sino-US Global Logistics Institute,Shanghai Jiaotong University1,Shanghai 200030,P.R.China; Department of Industrial Engineering & Logistics management,Shanghai Jiaotong University2,Shanghai 200240,P.R,China)
Abstract:A two-stage supply chain of one manufacture and one agency are studied under the condition of asymmetric information from the view of manufacture.By application of information screening in Early Order Commitment(EOC),the analytic models of the supply chain profit function is proposed based on the information economics theory.An incentive contract is proposed,analyzed its effect,explain its key index,and given out the optimal production volume.Conclusions demonstrate that the manufacture can re-structure the agency’s profit function by means of EOC price,and get the credible demand information from screening the agency’s purchase quantity under asymmetric information condition.
Keywords:information screening  early order commitment (EOC)  supply chain coordination  decision-making mechanism
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