| 超载运营行为的博弈经济分析——监管方与运输方的博弈行为与对策 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 赵昶.超载运营行为的博弈经济分析——监管方与运输方的博弈行为与对策[J].杭州师范学院学报(社会科学版),2004(5):71-73. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 赵昶 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 浙江财经学院,工商学院,浙江,杭州,310012 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 运营超载造成社会总福利下降,呈现明显外部负效应.现从博弈论的角度来阐述货运超载行为,建立了混合博弈模型,并进一步就运输方超载行为的预期收益和预期效用两个层面进行剖析,提出均衡政策因子弹性概念,从而为政策制订部门提供可定量化依据.
|
| 关 键 词： | 超载 博弈论 预期效用 弹性 |
| 文章编号： | 1293/Z(2004)05-0071-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年6月19日 |
An Economical Analysis of Overloading Action with Game Theory--the game between supervises, conveyances and countermeasures |
| |
| ZHAO Chang.An Economical Analysis of Overloading Action with Game Theory--the game between supervises, conveyances and countermeasures[J].Journal of Hangzhou Teachers College(Humanities and Social Sciences),2004(5):71-73. |
| |
| Authors: | ZHAO Chang |
| |
| Abstract: | This article is managed to analyze the actions of overloading with the Game Theory. After setting up game models, we can e-\{ssentially \}realize the transformation of the overloading. Furthermore, we study the difference between expectation of income and utility. Then we provide two main management implications for how to deal with the problem efficiently. |
| |
| Keywords: | overloading Game Theory expected elasticity |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
