考虑消费者行为的供应链定价与返利优化策略

返利是一种典型的拉式促销方式,被越来越多的供应链上游企业所采用。本文针对由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链系统,考虑消费者对返利的敏感程度不同,通过建立制造商为领导者的Stackclbcrg博弈模型,研究制造商和零售商的定价决策及制造商的返利决策。研究表明:消费者的返利敏感性对供应链中制造商的拉式促销策略存在重要影响,即仅当返利敏感型消费者对产品的估值满足一定条件时,制造商才会向消费者提供返利,且制造商对消费者进行拉式促销对其自身总是有利的。进一步的灵敏度分析发现,随着返利敏感型消费者的比例增大,会对制造商和零售商的利润产生正向影响;而随返利兑现率的逐渐增大,会使决策双方的利润均受损。

Optimal Pricing and Rebate Strategies in a Supply Chain Considering Consumer Behavior

Rebate is commonly used as a typical pull-up promotion tool by more and more manufacturers.This paper constructs a two-echelon supply chain system comprising a single manufacturer and a single retailer.By considering the different sensitivity of consumers for rebate, we study the pricing and rebate strategics of manufacturer and retailer by establishing a Stackclberg game model in which the manufacturer is a leader.Our results show that the sensitivity of consumers for rebate plays an important role to affect the manufacturer’s pull promotion.The manufacturers would like to provide rebates to consumers only if the product valuation of the rebate-sensitive consumers satisfies certain conditions.And it is always profitable for the manufacturer by taking pull promotion.More specifically,the numerical examples illustrate that more rebate-sensitive consumers results in more profits for the manufacturer and retailer,but a higher redemption hurts both supply chain mumbers.