| 随机需求下两级供应链回购协调机制供需双方Stackelberg博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈会琳,张科静.随机需求下两级供应链回购协调机制供需双方Stackelberg博弈分析[J].东华大学学报(自然科学版),2009,35(5). |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈会琳 张科静 |
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| 作者单位： | 东华大学,旭日工商管理学院,上海,200051 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海市科委资助项目，德国学术交流中心DAAD资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 市场需求的快速变化要求供应链成员企业采用灵活的协调机制来提高供应链的运营效率和利润.由单一供应商和单一零售商组成的供应链中,对供需双方分别占主导地位的回购协调机制进行研究,建立了Stackelberg博弈模型,考虑供应链市场需求信息对称且需求具有价格弹性,并确定模型的均衡解.通过Maple软件进行模拟仿真,分析决策变量之间的关系,计算不同类型供应链(无回购、供应商主导或零售商主导的回购机制)中供需双方的利润关系,证实回购机制可以达到双赢,并得出决策变量对利润的影响.模型为供应链成员企业提供决策支持,指导供需双方选择合适的博弈策略以实现销售目标.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链协调 回购机制 Stackelberg博弈 纳什均衡解 |
Stackelberg Game in a Two-echelon Supply Chain under Buy-back Coordination Mechanism |
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| CHEN Hui-lin,ZHANG Ke-jing.Stackelberg Game in a Two-echelon Supply Chain under Buy-back Coordination Mechanism[J].Journal of Donghua University,2009,35(5). |
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| Authors: | CHEN Hui-lin ZHANG Ke-jing |
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| Institution: | CHEN Hui-lin,ZHANG Ke-jing(Glorious Sun School of Business , Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China) |
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| Abstract: | Rapid change in market demand requires the flexible coordination mechanism,in order to improve the efficiency and profit of the supply chain. The full-return coordination mechanism in a two-echelon supply chain is analyzed,with either supplier or retailer in the dominant position. With symmetric information and price dependent demand considered,Stackelberg game models are proposed. The Nash equilibrium solutions can be derived. By simulation with Maple software,the model shows the relationships among the de... |
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| Keywords: | supply chain coordination full-return policy Stackelberg game Nash equilibrium solution |
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