| 基于非零和博弈的快件检验监管困境的研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 林国龙,刘琳,马占鑫,丁一.基于非零和博弈的快件检验监管困境的研究[J].科学技术与工程,2014,14(23). |
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| 作者姓名： | 林国龙 刘琳 马占鑫 丁一 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海海事大学物流研究中心,上海海事大学物流研究中心,上海海事大学物流研究中心,上海海事大学物流研究中心 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目（71301101），教育部博士点基金项目（20113121120002） |
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| 摘 要： | 检验检疫是国际贸易中的重要环节,重点是要提高整个检验链的工作效率和国际贸易供应链的效率。检验链上的检验方和多方被检之间的非零和博弈模型中引入信用等级打分的机制,将利用信用度的不同和成本因素综合考虑,旨在解决有限的预算下资源的分配问题。求解出非零和博弈模型的纳什均衡解,从不同的阶段,对不同的预算进行分析得到给定参与者不同预算下的纳什均衡,以助于解决资源限定下的资源分配问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 检验链 非零和博弈 监管困境 信用等级 |
| 收稿时间： | 3/8/2014 12:00:00 AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2014/4/14 0:00:00 |
Research on Regulatory Quandary of Express Inspection and Quarantine Based on Non-zero Game |
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| Liu Lin,Liu Lin,Ma Zhanxin and Ding Yi.Research on Regulatory Quandary of Express Inspection and Quarantine Based on Non-zero Game[J].Science Technology and Engineering,2014,14(23). |
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| Authors: | Liu Lin Liu Lin Ma Zhanxin and Ding Yi |
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| Institution: | Shanghai Maritime University,, |
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| Abstract: | This paper deals with an inspection and quarantine of international business. The main point of this paper is to discuss about how to improve the efficiency of the inspection chain and supply chain in international trade. A non-zero game model between inspectees and inspector will be considered with credit rating in the model. This model will consider about credit rating level and the cost to solve the arrangement of resource on limit budget. All the Nash equilibriums of the non-zero game can be found in different budget. This solution could help the decision maker to figure out the way to allocate limit resources appropriately. |
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| Keywords: | Inspection chain Non-zero game Regulatory quandary Credit rating |
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