基于委托-代理理论的口碑推荐激励机制研究

产品或服务的口碑推荐过程中,企业和口碑推荐者之间形成委托-代理激励契约关系.在信息对称情况下,企业和口碑推荐者可以达成"承包"方式的激励契约:只要推荐者成功推荐规定数量的接受者(顾客),即可获得企业提供的最优固定激励.在非对称信息情况下,企业和口碑推荐者可以达成"线性"方式的激励契约:只要口碑推荐者付出一定水平的努力投入(最优努力投入),即可获得企业提供的最优激励支付,并且实现契约利润效用的最大化.

Research into the Incentive Mechanism for Word-of-Mouth Recommendation Based on Principal-Agent Relationship

During the process of word-of-mouth （WOM） recommendation of a product or a service, an incentive contractual principal-agent relationship is formed between an enterprise and WOM recommenders, between whom an incentive contract can be reached under symmetric information. That is, as long as a recommender succeeds in recommending enough recipients （consumers） as stipulated by the enterprise, he will receive the optimal fixed premium offered by the enterprise. Under asymmetric information, a linear incentive contract can be signed between the enterprise and the recommenders, which means as long as the latter put their optimal effort into their work, they will acquire the optimal incentive reward provided by the former, hence maximizing the contractual benefits.