| 环境税征收的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 龙学锋,黄媛,马丽丽,李文磊. 环境税征收的博弈分析[J]. 中国传媒大学学报, 2010, 17(1): 69-71. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1673-4793.2010.01.012 |
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| 作者姓名： | 龙学锋 黄媛 马丽丽 李文磊 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国传媒大学学报,北京,100024;中国传媒大学理学院,北京,100024 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文基于博弈论理论,建立企业之间的博弈模型,研究环境税开征的必要性。博弈模型分析,发现企业不可能采取环境保护的生产方式进行生产。因此,进行环境保护需要依靠政府采取一定的强制手段——征收环境税。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境税 博弈理论 环境保护 |
The Analysis of Game Model about Environmental Tax |
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| LONG Xue-feng,HUANG Yuan,MA Li-li,LI Wen-lei. The Analysis of Game Model about Environmental Tax[J]. Journal of Communication University of China Science and TEchnology, 2010, 17(1): 69-71. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1673-4793.2010.01.012 |
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| Authors: | LONG Xue-feng HUANG Yuan MA Li-li LI Wen-lei |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Journal;Communication University of China;Beijing 100024;2.Science School;Beijing 100024 |
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| Abstract: | This paper builds game model among enterprises to study essentialness of imposing environmental tax based on game theory.The analysis of game model tells that enterprises can not adopt the production of environmental protection.Therefore,environmental protection need our government adopt definite forcible means-imposing environmental tax. |
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| Keywords: | environmental tax game theory environmental protection |
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