| 基于非完全信息期权博弈的企业并购决策时机 |
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| 引用本文： | 郑湘明,陈晓红. 基于非完全信息期权博弈的企业并购决策时机[J]. 系统工程, 2011, 0(7) |
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| 作者姓名： | 郑湘明 陈晓红 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南大学商学院; |
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| 摘 要： | 在并购目标企业产出价格服从几何布朗运动情形下,运用期权博弈理论研究了并购企业在不完全信息的情况下进行并购的最优时机,通过引入的风险率函数来描述不完全信息下竞争对手先行并购的风险程度。研究表明,风险率越高,并购企业进行并购的最优时机越早。
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| 关 键 词： | 期权博弈 并购 最优时机 风险率 |
The Decision-making Timing of Enterprise M&A under Incomplete Information Based on Real Option-game |
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| ZHENG Xiang-ming,CHEN Xiao-hong. The Decision-making Timing of Enterprise M&A under Incomplete Information Based on Real Option-game[J]. Systems Engineering, 2011, 0(7) |
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| Authors: | ZHENG Xiang-ming CHEN Xiao-hong |
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| Affiliation: | ZHENG Xiang-ming,CHEN Xiao-hong(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China) |
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| Abstract: | Under the situation where the output price of the goal enterprise of the M&A obey the Geometry-Brownian movement,this paper uses the real option-game theory to study the best decision-making timing of enterprise M&A under incomplete information,and introduces the risk rate function to describe the degree of the competitor's Merger risks.The study indicates that the higher the risk rate is,the earlier the best opportunity of enterprise M&A. |
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| Keywords: | Option-game M&A Best Timing Risk Rate |
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