| 加法需求模式下具有风险厌恶零售商的供应链合作博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 马利军,刘芳梅,林旭东.加法需求模式下具有风险厌恶零售商的供应链合作博弈分析[J].系统管理学报,2011,20(4). |
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| 作者姓名： | 马利军 刘芳梅 林旭东 |
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| 作者单位： | 深圳大学管理学院,广东深圳,518060 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71001073,71071134) |
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| 摘 要： | 考虑了一个风险厌恶型的零售商面临依赖价格的随机需求的供应链合作博弈问题.零售商以条件在险价值(CVaR)作为其风险衡量,制造商为风险中性,研究了最优均衡批发价格、零售价格和订货量,从而发现,在加法需求模式下,具有相同协商权利时的Nash博弈问题和具有不同协商权利时的Nash博弈问题都存在均衡解,并将加法需求模式与一般随机需求的情况进行比较分析,发现当需求噪声服从均匀分布时,在加法需求模式下,制造商占整个供应链的利润比例比在一般随机需求情况下的大.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链管理 合作博弈 Nash讨价还价 加法需求模式 条件在险价值(CVaR) |
Channel Bargaining with Risk-averse Retailer under the Additive Demand Model |
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| MA Li-jun
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LIU Fang-mei
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LIN Xu-dong.Channel Bargaining with Risk-averse Retailer under the Additive Demand Model[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2011,20(4). |
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| Authors: | MA Li-jun LIU Fang-mei LIN Xu-dong |
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| Institution: | MA Li-jun,LIU Fang-mei,LIN Xu-dong(School of Management,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518060,Guangdong,China) |
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| Abstract: | We consider a channel bargaining problem in which a risk-averse retailer faces a price-dependent stochastic demand.Using the conditional value-at-risk(CVaR) as the risk measure,we study the wholesale price,selling price and order quantity under optimal equilibrium and find that there exist equilibria for the equal bargaining-power problem as well as for the unequal bargaining-power problem in the additive demand model.We also study comparative statics to show how the manufacturer's profit-share changes with... |
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| Keywords: | supply chain management cooperative game Nash-bargaining additive demand model conditional value at rist(CVaR) |
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