基于信号博弈的最优企业年金支出决策

考察外部劳动力市场上雇主企业年金支出的激励机制.建立一个信号博弈模型, 雇主拥有私人信息,通过企业年金支出塑造声誉吸引人才.引入信号成本与信号间的随机关系和雇员 的不完美观察,考察雇主的最优信号成本决策. 给出了最优信号成本的图形解和算例,并考察了均衡 稳定性以及不完美观察对最优信号成本的影响. 研究发现:稳定的零均衡必然存在; 多均衡下是否存在信号成本支出不确定;观察完美程度与信号成本的关系不确定. 这表明外部劳动力市场上雇主提供企业年金的激励不足, 推动企业年金发展尚需提高雇主的收益.

The optimal occupational pensions expenses decision based on signal game

The paper explored the incentive of employers to contribute to occupational pensions on external labor market.A signal game model,in which employers had private information and contributed to occupational pensions to signal their type to attract employees,was set up.Introducing stochastic mapping from signal cost to signal and employees' imperfect observation this paper examined the optimal signal cost of employers.This paper gave the graphic solution and numerical examples and examined the equilibrium stab...