信息生产的分工与激励

由于信息生产成本，起作用的是激励代理人获取信息的约束。私利的存在，束紧了这一约束。其结果是导致期望薪酬激励成本增加。不过，私利的存在也减少了代理人在没有获取足够信息的情况下报告项目不可行的动机，导致期望的薪酬激励成本减少。信息生产成本，私利影响的净效果决定了项目投资决策过程中信息生产的分工与激励。

Delegation of Information Acquisition and Incentive

Among the information acquisition costs, it is most important to present private benefits.This increases incentive costs and is a negative effect of private benefits.However,private benefits of control reduce the agent incentive to forecast a failure without enough information. This decreases incentive costs and is a positive effect of private benefits. The delegation of information acquisition and incentive depend on the cost of information acquisition cost and the net effect of private (benefits) on the process of decision-making of project investment.