| 银行信贷决策博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 曹洁.银行信贷决策博弈分析[J].广州大学学报(自然科学版),2006,5(6):86-90. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曹洁 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南师范大学,经济与管理学院,广东,广州,510006 |
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| 摘 要： | 在信贷市场上,贷款企业在经营和资金运用方面都比银行拥有更多的信息优势,容易出现逆向选择和道德风险问题,损害银行利益.这种银企之间的信息不对称现象,一定程度上使银行不愿对缺乏相应信息的企业提供信贷支持,从而产生“惜贷”行为.文章从博弈论的角度,论述银企之间信贷博弈关系,分析造成银行“惜贷”的成因,试图找出相应的对策.
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| 关 键 词： | 惜贷 博弈 信息不对称 逆向选择 道德风险 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-4229(2006)06-0086-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-03-10 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-06-10 |
Game theory analysis of credit decision behavior of banks |
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| CAO Jie.Game theory analysis of credit decision behavior of banks[J].Journal og Guangzhou University:Natural Science Edition,2006,5(6):86-90. |
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| Authors: | CAO Jie |
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| Institution: | School of Economy and Management, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510006, China |
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| Abstract: | In the credit market,the enterprises have more advantages than banks in the aspects of business running and using capital.Asymmetric information between banks and enterprises causes adverse selection before credit and moral hazard afterwards.The banks tend to be credit grudging in order to avoid from losing.With a game theory analysis of the behavior of banks and enterprises,this paper discusses the cause of banks' credit grudging in order to find out effective and sensible countermeasures. |
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| Keywords: | credit grudging game theory asymmetric information adverse selection moral hazard |
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