基于纳什谈判的供应商-销售商联合促销线性合约设计

在供应链联合促销中, 双边道德风险的存在使得供应商和销售商双方都有强烈的"搭便车"激励, 而合理的利益分配对促进合作双方积极投入具有重要作用. 运用纳什谈判解, 构造了供应链联合促销的相互激励模型, 并考察了最优线性合约的存在性. 研究表明: 在合作能产生净剩余的条件下, 存在最优的批发价格使渠道收益达到极大; 尽管谈判能力对最优批发价格没有影响, 但合作收益在双方之间的分配却依赖于各自具有的谈判能力. 研究指出: 各方分得的合作剩余与自身的谈判能力成正比, 与对方的谈判能力成反比.

Linear contract design for supplier-retailer joint promotion based on Nash bargaining

In joint sale promotion of supply chains, the supplier and retailer have a strong incentive of "free riding" due to double moral hazard. It is helpful of the reasonable profit sharing rule to promote active inputs of both parties. By means of Nash bargaining concept, it established mutually incentive model and investigated existence of the optimal linear contract for supply chains joint promotion. It shows that the optimal wholesale price exists on the condition of existence of net cooperative residual and the bargaining powers, on which the allocation of net residual depends, have no impact on the optimal wholesale price. What's more, it points out that the ratio of net cooperative residuals acquired by the two parties is in proportion to the ratio of bargaining power factors.