纵向差异化双边市场中平台策略

基于抽象函数建立了纵向差异化双边市场的一般模型, 并利用一般模型讨论了垄断与双寡头情形下的市场均衡特征以及在双寡头情形下价格变动的战略效应. 进一步在均匀分布的假设下分析了网络外部性参数与质量差距变量对市场均衡时价格与利润的影响. 研究发现, 在一般模型中, 垄断平台能够比双寡头平台更加有效地协调两边的价格结构; 双寡头平台的竞争呈现强者更强的效应; 双寡头平台竞争中价格具有战略互补效应, 而下游市场的战略互补效应要高于上游市场的战略互补效应. 基于均匀分布假设可以得到, 低质量平台宜采取"分而治之"的策略, 高质量平台则宜"因时而动".

Platform strategy in vertically differentiated two-sided markets

A general-purpose model associated with vertically differentiated two-sided markets is established based on an abstract function. Using the general-purpose model, the paper discusses the features of market equilibriums in both a monopoly and a duopoly markets, and explores strategic effects of price change in the duopoly market. The paper further studies the impact of the parameters of network externality and the variable of quality gap on equilibrium prices and profits under the assumption of uniform distribution of consumer preference. The following conclusions are obtained by using the general-purpose model. Firstly, a monopoly platform can coordinate the price structure of the two sides more effectively than duopoly platforms. Secondly, a positive feedback exists in competition between duopoly platforms. Thirdly, prices have strategic complementary effect in duopoly competition, and this effect is stronger on the downstream side than on the upstream side. Under the assumption of uniform distribution, the paper finds that the low-quality platform should take the strategy of "divide and conquer", while the high-quality platform should exert the strategy of "act according to circumstances".