奖惩机制下规范建筑垃圾清运行为的演化博弈

就现有情况而言,政府环保部门需要改革对建筑垃圾清运行为的管理并采取更加合理的奖惩机制,使得相关单位自觉进行建筑垃圾清运过程中的整改.本文对现有政府和建筑垃圾清运单位可能采取的两种策略进行演化博弈模型的构建,针对双方收益变化时出现的四种演化稳定情况分析政府奖惩机制的改变对演化稳定点的影响,并运用MATLAB进行数值仿真以分析策略选择的过程和演变趋势,验证模型的有效性.最后提出对政府奖惩机制的几点建议.

Evolutionary Game of Regulating Cleaning Behavior of Construction Waste under Reward and Punishment Mechanism

As far as the current situation is concerned, the environmental protection department of the government needs to reform the management of construction waste clearing and transportation and adopt a more reasonable reward and punishment mechanism, so that relevant units can consciously carry out the rectification in the process of construction waste clearing and transportation. This paper constructs the evolutionary game model of the two strategies that the existing government and the construction waste clearing and transportation unit may adopt, analyzes the impact of the change of government reward and punishment mechanism on the evolutionary stability point according to the four evolutionary stability situations when the two sides'' income changes, and uses MATLAB to carry out numerical simulation to analyze the process and evolution trend of strategy selection, which verifies the validity of the model. Finally, some suggestions on the government''s reward and punishment mechanism are put forward.