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政府激励政策下物联网健康建筑开发关键主体博弈研究
引用本文:吴伟东,景奕杰,张琳,余晓钟. 政府激励政策下物联网健康建筑开发关键主体博弈研究[J]. 科技促进发展, 2020, 16(12): 1519-1526
作者姓名:吴伟东  景奕杰  张琳  余晓钟
作者单位:西南石油大学土木工程与测绘学院 成都 610500;西南石油大学经济管理学院 成都 610500
基金项目:年国家社会科学基金委员会一般项目(18XGJ001):“一带一路”背景下中国与中亚能源合作模式创新研究,负责人:余晓钟。
摘    要:在政府大力推广健康建筑及建筑产业现代化的背景下,物联网体系下的健康建筑作为建筑行业的新产物逐渐出现在人们的视野里,但由于其成本高及资金回收周期长等特点,使得开发商和银行对这类产品的投资积极性不高。为寻求物联网健康建筑的快速发展,本文采用演化博弈的方法,建立“政府—开发商”、“政府—银行”的动态演化博弈模型,提出政府激励政策下的开发商和银行三方利益主体达到帕累托最优均衡的对策建议。通过研究得出:政府仅使用市场这只“无形的手”不能达到物联网健康建筑快速发展的目的;政府通过市场机制、奖惩措施、税收调节和组织、宣传成本支出等的共同作用,引导开发商和银行开发物联网健康建筑,最终实现博弈主体的利益共赢。

关 键 词:健康建筑  物联网  演化博弈  政府
收稿时间:2020-02-03
修稿时间:2020-08-06

Research on the Game of Key Players in Healthy Building Development of Internet of Things under Government Incentive Policies
Wu Weidong,Jing Yijie,Zhang Lin and Yu Xiaozhong. Research on the Game of Key Players in Healthy Building Development of Internet of Things under Government Incentive Policies[J]. Science & Technology for Development, 2020, 16(12): 1519-1526
Authors:Wu Weidong  Jing Yijie  Zhang Lin  Yu Xiaozhong
Affiliation:School of Civil Engineering and Geomatics Southwest Petroleum University, Chengdu 610500,School of Civil Engineering and Geomatics Southwest Petroleum University, Chengdu 610500,School of Economics and Management Southwest Petroleum University, Chengdu 610500
Abstract:Under the background that the government vigorously promotes healthy building and the modernization of the construction industry, healthy building under the Internet of things system gradually appear in people"s vision as a new product of the construction industry. However, due to its high cost and long capital recovery cycle, enterprises and banks have little enthusiasm for investment in such products. In order to seek the rapid development of the healthy building of the Internet of things, this paper adopts the evolutionary game method to establish the dynamic evolutionary game model: government and enterprises, government and banks. Meanwhile, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to achieve the Pareto optimal equilibrium between enterprises and banks under government incentive policies. Through the research, the government cannot achieve the rapid development of healthy buildings in the Internet of things by only using the "invisible hand" of the market;it guides developers and Banks to develop healthy buildings of the Internet of things through the combined effects of market mechanism, incentive and punishment measures, tax regulation and organization, and publicity costs, so as to realize the win-win interests of game players.
Keywords:healthy building  internet of things  evolutionary game  government
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