| 排污申报机制设计的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 肖江文,罗云峰,赵勇,岳超源. 排污申报机制设计的博弈分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2002, 22(11): 87-91. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2002)11-87 |
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| 作者姓名： | 肖江文 罗云峰 赵勇 岳超源 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中科技大学系统工程研究所 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目 (60 0 740 3 3 ) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于不完全信息 Stackelberg动态博弈模型 ,建立了排污权交易制度中政府管理机构让各排污企业申报排污量的博弈模型 .分别就政府管理机构的平均主义与非平均主义偏好两种情况对模型进行了分析 ,并对政府政策的动态一致性问题进行了讨论.
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| 关 键 词： | 排污权交易 排污申报 Stackelberg博弈 动态一致性 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-6788(2002)11-0087-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001-04-09 |
Game Analysis on Mechanism Design of Emission Declaration |
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| XIAO Jiang|wen,LUO Yun|feng,ZHAO Yong,YUE Chao|yuan. Game Analysis on Mechanism Design of Emission Declaration[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2002, 22(11): 87-91. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2002)11-87 |
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| Authors: | XIAO Jiang|wen LUO Yun|feng ZHAO Yong YUE Chao|yuan |
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| Affiliation: | Institute of Systems Eng,Huazhong University of Science and Technology |
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| Abstract: | A game model based on the Stackelberg dynamic game with incomplete information is established, which is used for firms to declare their emission levels to government in the tradable emission permits system. The Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution is discussed. The policy dynamic consistency of the regulatory authority is then analyzed, and the reason that causes the policy inconsistent is pointed out. |
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| Keywords: | tradable emission permits emission declaration Stackelberg dynamic game dynamic consistency |
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