| 中国电信产业市场化改革绩效的动态博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 吕志勇,陈宏民,李瑞海.中国电信产业市场化改革绩效的动态博弈分析[J].系统管理学报,2005,14(1):62-67. |
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| 作者姓名： | 吕志勇 陈宏民 李瑞海 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(70172001) |
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| 摘 要： | 运用规范的产业组织动态博弈模型,对20世纪90年代以来中国电信产业市场化改革绩效加以研究,结果表明:不对称结构下在位厂商的策略性行为会扼制进入厂商,阻碍市场竞争;纵向分割虽导致双重加价,但却从根本上推动了电信竞争;横向分割初期的统一定价管制和网络竞争导致的用户信息不对称会阻碍本地网接入竞争,应通过移动厂商基于终接的差别定价和用户信息甄别措施来增加社会福利。
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| 关 键 词： | 电信产业 动态博弈 纵向分割 横向分割 竞争 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-2542(2005)01-0062-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年2月17日 |
Dynamic Game Analysis of the Performance of Chinese Telecommunications Deregulation |
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| LU Zhi-yong,CHEN Hong-min,LI Rui-hai.Dynamic Game Analysis of the Performance of Chinese Telecommunications Deregulation[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2005,14(1):62-67. |
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| Authors: | LU Zhi-yong CHEN Hong-min LI Rui-hai |
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| Abstract: | This paper reviewing Chinese telecommunications deregulation during 1990s with normative dynamic game models of industrial organization theory concluded that the incumbent firm's strategic behavior would impair the new firm's participation in unsymmetrical market. Vertical segmentation could facilitate network competition in spite of double marginalization, and horizontal segmentation led to imperfect competition because of uniform pricing and lack of information. We show that differential pricing depending on termination and information discrimination can increase the total social welfare. |
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| Keywords: | telecommunications industry dynamic game vertical segmentation horizontal segmentation competition |
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