| 对企业经营者机会主义行为的监控策略分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 罗宜美,刘兵. 对企业经营者机会主义行为的监控策略分析[J]. 系统工程学报, 2000, 15(3): 295-298 |
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| 作者姓名： | 罗宜美 刘兵 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072
2. 河北工业大学管理学院,天津,300130 |
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| 摘 要： | 对经营者机会主义行为的监控机制关系到企业效益、社会福利的优化,本文运用最优化的思路,分析制定了最优的监督、举报、调查和惩罚措施,以防范和惩治经营者的机会主义行为,在非对称信息存在条件下讨论了这些举措之间的关系,得出了具有现实指导意义的最优监控策略。
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| 关 键 词： | 机会主义行为 最优监控策略 企业经营者 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000-01-24 |
Monitoring tactics of managers' opportunism |
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| LUO Yi-mei,LIU Bing. Monitoring tactics of managers' opportunism[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering, 2000, 15(3): 295-298 |
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| Authors: | LUO Yi-mei LIU Bing |
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| Abstract: | It's very important to monitor managers' opportunism, because it has a bearing on the firms' profits and the social welfare. According to the optimum theory, monitoring, victim's report, investigation and punishment are discussed and can be used to avoid and punish managers' opportunism. With asymmetric information, their relations are given, and the optimum monitoring tactics with practical significance is shown in the paper. |
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| Keywords: | opportunism optimum theory asymmetric information optimal monitoring tactics |
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