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战略利益影响中日石油博弈研究
引用本文:谢青 岳亮. 战略利益影响中日石油博弈研究[J]. 西安联合大学学报, 2004, 7(6): 79-81
作者姓名:谢青 岳亮
作者单位:西安交通大学管理学院,西安交通大学管理学院 陕西西安710049,陕西西安710049
摘    要:立足于中日两国由国内需求和国际市场供应而形成的石油关系,通过分析中日油气之争的供需背景和起因,在中日两国维护国家战略利益最大化的前提下,利用博弈理论的观点,推导出受制于战略利益的中日间进行的石油能源博弈实现双赢的纳什均衡的不可实现性,阐明中日对俄罗斯远东石油竞争的不可避免性和非合作性,并预计在更广的地域范围这种不妥协性竞争将影响到我国海外能源战略的实施。

关 键 词:中日博弈 石油之争 零和博弈
文章编号:1008-777X(2004)06-0079-03
修稿时间:2004-06-25

Strategic Benefit''''s Effect on Petroleum Competition Between China and Japan
XIE Qing,YUE Ling. Strategic Benefit''''s Effect on Petroleum Competition Between China and Japan[J]. , 2004, 7(6): 79-81
Authors:XIE Qing  YUE Ling
Abstract:On the basis of domestic demand and international market supply for petroleum in China and Japan, this paper makes an analysis of its background and causes of supply and demand. For the protection of both countries' strategic benefits, in light of the game theory, a double win game of oil supply can seldom be realized. The oil competition in the Far East between China and Japan will be unavoidable and not cooperative. It can also be predicted that, to an even greater extent, this non-compromise competition will affect the implementation of overseas energy strategy.
Keywords:competition between China and Japan  petroleum competition   zero-sum game
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