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对上市公司管理者的监管博弈分析
引用本文:杨柏,蒲勇健. 对上市公司管理者的监管博弈分析[J]. 重庆大学学报(自然科学版), 2004, 27(11): 120-124
作者姓名:杨柏  蒲勇健
作者单位:重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030;重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030
摘    要:在研究上市公司业绩操纵行为监管时,公司管理者的行为越来越受到重视.通过建立一个博弈模型,分析了公司管理者进行业绩操纵的动机与影响因素.分析表明,公司管理者进行业绩操纵的最优策略是由证监会的收益和证监会对公司业绩类型的先验概率决定,而证监会监管的最优策略是由上市公司的最终收益决定,公司管理者和证监会之间存在着相互推测、相互影响的关系.最后,对所建立的模型进行了实证研究.

关 键 词:业绩操纵  证券监管  最优策略
文章编号:1000-582X(2004)11-0120-05
修稿时间:2004-04-05

Analysis on the Game of Supervision on the Listed Company's Administrator
YANG Bai,PU Yong-jian. Analysis on the Game of Supervision on the Listed Company's Administrator[J]. Journal of Chongqing University(Natural Science Edition), 2004, 27(11): 120-124
Authors:YANG Bai  PU Yong-jian
Abstract:When studying on the supervision on listed company performance manipulation, the administrator's role has been emphasized increasingly. By setting up a game model, the article analyzes the performance manipulation made by the listed company's administrator. The analysis shows that the optimal performance manipulation strategy taken by the administrator is determined by the profits obtained by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the prior probability of the listed company performance categories made by CSRC, while the optimal supervision strategy taken by CSRC is determined by the final profits of the listed company. Thus, it is obvious that there is a mutual guessing and influencing relationship between the listed company's administrator and CSRC. Finally, the game model constructed is further analyzed by employing it in the real cases.
Keywords:performance manipulation  securities supervision  optimal strategy
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