基于损失规避的创新竞赛参与者的行为决策研究

基于创新竞赛中解答者存在损失规避心理这一现象,运用博弈理论针对创意型和专业型两种创新竞赛分别构建了损失规避情况下的博弈模型,求得解答者的最优努力水平、发起者的最优奖金设定及发起者的最大收益,并将损失规避情况存在与否的结果进行了比较,结果表明:两种不同类型竞赛中解答者为了规避损失,都相应降低了努力水平,而发起者为了保障竞赛的持续进行并未降低奖金的设定.另外,考虑了损失规避逆转情况下参与者的行为决策,并与不存在损失规避情况下的值进行了比较,结果表明:两种不同类型竞赛中解答者因实现自我挑战,忽视物质奖励,反而提升了努力水平.最后,通过算例分析表明了模型的有效性,也为创新竞赛的成功举办提供一定的理论指导.

Behavioral decision making of participants in innovation contest with loss aversion

Because the probability of winning the award is small for most of the contestants, to some extent there exists the phenomenon of loss aversion in innovation contest. Firstly, two game models were developed for ideation contest and expertise-based contest respectively. In addition, we got the solutions of solvers' effort level and the sponsor's award amount. Secondly, for these two kinds of innovation contests, we made a comparison of the solutions of the game models considering loss-aversion and the results of the models without loss aversion. The comparison indicated that the solvers' effort levels of the two different types of innovation contest were reduced accordingly due to their avoid losses preference, while the sponsor could not reduce the award amount in order to ensure the continuity of the contest. Thirdly, we considered the behavior of participants in the decision-making under loss aversion reversed and made a comparison of the solutions of the game models with the results of the models without loss aversion. The comparison indicated that the solvers would ignore material reward because of achieving self-challenge and their effort levels were increased in the two different types of innovation contest. Finally, numerical examples were provided to elaborate the validity of the models. This paper also made several theoretical contributions to guide the innovation contest practice.