| 供应链中不完全信息下供应商联合竞价模型 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 张雁,徐鑫,周其明.供应链中不完全信息下供应商联合竞价模型[J].安徽师范大学学报(自然科学版),2006,29(1):23-25. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 张雁 徐鑫 周其明 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 安徽交通职业技术学院,文理科学系,合肥,230051;中国科技大学,商学院,合肥,230026;合肥工业大学,数学系,合肥,230009;合肥工业大学,人文经济学院,合肥,230009 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 针对供应链中单一购买者市场下的供应商之间的竞争,研究了供应商联营体的最优拍卖机制.将供应商的生产成本或生产函数看作私人信息,并应用博弈论中相关理论,建立了不完全信息条件下供应商联营体最优拍卖机制的理论模型.
|
| 关 键 词： | 不完全信息 博弈论 交易机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-2443（2006）01-0023-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-01-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年1月8日 |
Model of Supplier's Bidding Mechanism with Incomplete Information in Supply Chain |
| |
| ZHANG Yan,XU Xin,ZHOU Qi-ming.Model of Supplier's Bidding Mechanism with Incomplete Information in Supply Chain[J].Journal of Anhui Normal University(Natural Science Edition),2006,29(1):23-25. |
| |
| Authors: | ZHANG Yan XU Xin ZHOU Qi-ming |
| |
| Institution: | 1.Department of Literature and Science, Anhui Communications Vocational and Technical College, Hefei 230051, China; 2. Business School, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; 3. Department of Mathematics, HeFei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China; 4. School of Liberal Arts and Economics, HeFei University of Technology, Hefel 230009,China |
| |
| Abstract: | Aiming at the competitions between suppliers in the one-buyer-market in the supply chain, the optimal bidding mechanism of supplies is studied. The production costs or functions of supplies are regarded as their own private informations. By using the related principles of game theory, the theoretical model of optimal bidding mechanism is established in the environment with incomplete information. |
| |
| Keywords: | incomplete information game theory transaction mechanism |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
