| 局中人数目变动时非凸合作对策分配问题的研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 罗晓,肖人彬,李敉安. 局中人数目变动时非凸合作对策分配问题的研究[J]. 华中科技大学学报(自然科学版), 1994, 0(1) |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 罗晓 肖人彬 李敉安 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 清华大学，清华大学自动化系 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 对允许局中人数目变动时，有边支付、非凸合作对策形式给出的分配问题进行了研究。建立了所研究问题的统一模型框架，提出了一些新的概念。得到了核心分配原则的充要条件，给出了核心分配原则的一个简单充分条件，并给出了一个判定核心分配原则的有用结论，最后还获得了一类非凸合作对策的Ｓｈａｐｌｅｙ值是核心分配的结论。
|
| 关 键 词： | 决策理论；合作对策；特征函数；核心分配原则；Shapley值 |
On the Allocation Pfoblem in Nonconvex Cooperative Games with a Variable Population of Players |
| |
| Luo Xiao,Xiao Renbin,Li Mi''''an. On the Allocation Pfoblem in Nonconvex Cooperative Games with a Variable Population of Players[J]. JOURNAL OF HUAZHONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.NATURE SCIENCE, 1994, 0(1) |
| |
| Authors: | Luo Xiao Xiao Renbin Li Mi''''an |
| |
| Affiliation: | Luo Xiao;Xiao Renbin;Li Mi'an |
| |
| Abstract: | The allocation problem given by transferable utility cooperative games with a variablepopulation of players is investigated.Aunified model format is developed and many new con-cepts are presented.The sufficient and necessary condition for the core allocation principle isobtained and a simplified sufficient conditioh for core allocation is given,Auseful result for distinguishing the core allocation principle from the given allocation principle is proposed.A conclusion that the Shapley value for a certain kind of nonconvex cooperative games is coreallocation principle is also obtained. |
| |
| Keywords: | decision theory cooperative games characteristic function core allocation principle Shapley value |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录！ |
