双层委托模式下政府采购合同融资激励机制研究

针对中小企业融资难和供应链金融中现有的道德风险问题,考虑利用委托代理理论为财政部提出的政府采购合同融资模式制定适当的激励契约.运用委托代理理论构建政府采购部门、第三方物流企业、中标的中小企业的双层委托代理模型,并对其进行分析求解,在上述解的基础上运用Matlab软件进行仿真实验,验证了不同参数变化对激励契约变化的影响....

Simulation analysis of incentive mechanism of government procurement contract financing based on two-layer principal-agent model

In view of the difficulty of financing for small and medium-sized enterprises and the moral risk in supply chain finance, the principal-agent theory was adopted to make appropriate incentive contracts for the financing mode of government procurement contracts proposed by the Ministry of finance. Based on the principal-agent theory, a two-layer principal-agent model of government procurement departments, third-party logistics enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises winning the bid was constructed. The model was then analyzed and solved. Based on the above solutions, Matlab software was used to conduct simulation experiments to verify the influence of different parameters on the change of incentive contract. It is found that the enterprise''s effort level under the condition of information asymmetry is less than that under the condition of information symmetry. By increasing the effort output coefficient and decreasing the effort cost coefficient, the effort level and incentive remuneration can be improved. By reducing the risk aversion of enterprises and paying close attention to exogenous random factors outside the market, the generation of general agency costs can be reduced.