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对国有企业经营者激励机制的探讨
引用本文:袁庆禄,李红杰,龚廷秀. 对国有企业经营者激励机制的探讨[J]. 山西科技, 2005, 0(5): 68-69,71
作者姓名:袁庆禄  李红杰  龚廷秀
作者单位:1. 贵州大学经济学院
2. 河南省信阳市职业技术学院
摘    要:现代企业制度的“两权分离”,导致了企业委托一代理关系问题的产生。文章分析了年薪制和股票期权制两种激励机制的优劣点,国有企业在运用两种激励机制一系列现实问题。对如何找到一个适合我国现阶段国情的可操作激励模式,如何通过薪酬制度的设定来激励企业经营者、约束经营者的行为提出自己的认识和建议。

关 键 词:委托-代理 年薪制 股票激励
文章编号:1004-6429(2005)05-0068-03
收稿时间:2005-06-17
修稿时间:2005-06-17

Probes into the Incentive Mechanism for Operators of State0owned Enterprises
Yuan Qinglu,Li Hongjie,Gong Tingxiu. Probes into the Incentive Mechanism for Operators of State0owned Enterprises[J]. Shanxi Science and Technology, 2005, 0(5): 68-69,71
Authors:Yuan Qinglu  Li Hongjie  Gong Tingxiu
Abstract:The "separation of two rights" in modern enterprises led to a series of problems of trust-agent relations. This article has analyzed the advantage and disadvantage of two incentive mechanisms of the yearly-salary system and share system, made clear of a series of problems in state-owned enterprises applying the two incentive systems and proposed some understanding and suggestions how to get a suitable incentive mode and how to encourage and restrain the behavior of operators through salary systems.
Keywords:trust- agent   yearly- salary system   stock encouraging
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