| 寡头厂商二度价格歧视静态与动态博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 高兴佑.寡头厂商二度价格歧视静态与动态博弈分析[J].曲靖师范学院学报,2003,22(6):25-28. |
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| 作者姓名： | 高兴佑 |
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| 作者单位： | 曲靖师范学院,数学系,云南,曲靖,655000 |
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| 摘 要： | 在线性需求函数条件下，用博弈论的方法对两实力相当寡头和1领导厂商1追随厂商市场情形二度价格歧视的方法进行分析，并对两情形价格歧视的特点作了比较．研究结果表明，两实力相当寡头进行二度价格歧视，获取的消费剩余更多，对消费更为不利．
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| 关 键 词： | 线性需求 寡头厂商 二度价格歧视 博弈论 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-8879(2003)06-0025-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年7月17日 |
Static and dynamic games of oligarchic enterprises on second degree price discrimination |
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| GAO Xing-you.Static and dynamic games of oligarchic enterprises on second degree price discrimination[J].Journal of Qujing Normal College,2003,22(6):25-28. |
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| Authors: | GAO Xing-you |
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| Abstract: | Under the condition of linear demand function, we analyzed the method of second degree price discrimination and compared it's characteristics in the case of two oligarchic enterprises that have equal power and a leading and a following one by using the method of game theory. The conclusions show that consumer's surplus will be gained more on the grounds of second degree price discrimination being enforced by two oligarchic enterprises that have equal power. For consumers, that is more harmful. |
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| Keywords: | Linear demand oligarchic enterprises second degree price discrimination game theory |
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