| 特许权人风险厌恶条件下的基础设施特许权合约分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 于国安.特许权人风险厌恶条件下的基础设施特许权合约分析[J].合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版),2006,29(3):361-364. |
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| 作者姓名： | 于国安 |
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| 作者单位： | 河南财经学院,工商管理系,河南,郑州,450002 |
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| 摘 要： | 一个基础设施特许权合约,可以被看作一个委托代理框架下的报酬支付合约。基于这样一个理论框架,利用逆向递推方法,文章对没有政府担保下,特许权人为风险厌恶的政府特许权合约的报酬设计进行分析,给出了政府特许权人的风险态度和服务定价之间的关系。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府担保 风险厌恶 政府特许权项目 合约设计 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5060(2006)03-0361-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年4月1日 |
Analysis of the infrastructure concession contract when the concessionaire is risk-averse |
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| YU Guo-an.Analysis of the infrastructure concession contract when the concessionaire is risk-averse[J].Journal of Hefei University of Technology(Natural Science),2006,29(3):361-364. |
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| Authors: | YU Guo-an |
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| Abstract: | An infrastructure concession contract can be regarded as a payoff contract in the principal-agent theory.Based on this theory,an analysis of the problem of payoff to the concessionaire in the concession contract when there are not government guarantees and the concessionaire is risk-averse is carried out by using the backward-induction method.The influence of the risk of the infrastructure concession project on user charges is also analyzed. |
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| Keywords: | government guarantee risk-aversion infrastructure concession project contract design |
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