| 默契合谋下的市场价格操纵机理分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 蔡继荣,. 默契合谋下的市场价格操纵机理分析[J]. 重庆工商大学学报(自然科学版), 2011, 28(3): 250-253 |
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| 作者姓名： | 蔡继荣 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆工商大学,商务策划学院,重庆,400067 |
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| 基金项目： | 重庆市科委自然科学基金项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 默契合谋下的市场价格操纵是非寡头垄断市场中企业之间为推动市场价格快速上涨而采取的策略性行为,是同业竞争企业的自主定价行为及其交互影响的结果.对基于Bertrand双头垄断博弈模型进行了分析,揭示出了默契合谋下价格操纵的动力机制、过程机理和实现条件.
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| 关 键 词： | 价格操纵 默契合谋 机理 条件 |
Study on Mechanism of Tacit Collusions for Market Price Manipulation |
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| CAI Ji-rong. Study on Mechanism of Tacit Collusions for Market Price Manipulation[J]. Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:Natural Science Edition, 2011, 28(3): 250-253 |
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| Authors: | CAI Ji-rong |
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| Abstract: | Market price manipulation under tacit collusions is strategic behavior of interfirm to promote rapid rise of market price in non-oligopoly markets,which are processes of independent pricing,process mechanism and interacting among competitors.The dynamic mechanism,process and realizing conditions for tacit collusions of price manipulation can be revealed by an analysis based on Bertrand s duopoly game model. |
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| Keywords: | price manipulation tacit collusion mechanism condition |
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