我国公共信用数据库建设的激励问题研究

建立公共信用数据库是尽快建成我国社会信用体系的一项必要而紧迫的任务。本文研究的目的是为政府在不同情况下识别信用信息拥有者对公共信用数据库的态度，并进行相应的激励提供理论支持。通过运用委托一代理模型等数量分析方法，研究发现，在对称信息下，政府可以看出信用信息拥有者的态度，能有效地对其进行奖励或惩罚；在不对称信息条件下，政府只能通过观察到的信息提供平均成本推断信用信息拥有者对公共信用数据库建设的支持程度，并据此对其进行激励，政府承担较大的风险，因此，政府需要加强对信用信息拥有者的调查和了解，以提高激励效果。

On the Incentives in the Public Credit Database Construction

In order to set up the social credit system in a short term, it is necessary and urgent to construct the public credit database. This article aims to help the government to just the attitude of credit data holders and take proper incentive measurements. With the principal-agent theory, it is found that, under symmetric information condition, the government is able to see the credit data holders' attitude and able to make proper praises or punishment. But under asymmetric information condition, the government is only able to decide the incentive measurements by deducing the holders' attitude according to the seen credit data providing average cost. The government burdens most of the risk. In order to raise th efficiency of its incentive measurements, the government needs to take further knowledge about the credit data holders.