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面向承运人与发货人联盟的调度博弈
引用本文:宋鹏,陈峰.面向承运人与发货人联盟的调度博弈[J].上海交通大学学报,2010,44(12):1682-1686.
作者姓名:宋鹏,陈峰
作者单位:(上海交通大学 工业工程与物流工程系, 上海 200240)
摘    要:通过分析发货人的时间成本函数与承运人的运输成本,提出由发货人与承运人所构成联盟的价值函数,并建立了合作博弈模型.利用一种有效算法对该模型的核进行求解,得出有效的收益分配机制.最后,并给出了模型的应用实例.

关 键 词:摘要:  通过分析发货人的时间成本函数与承运人的运输成本  提出由发货人与承运人所构成联盟的价值函数  并建立了合作博弈模型.利用一种有效算法对该模型的核进行求解  得出有效的收益分配机制.最后  并给出了模型的应用实例.
关键词:
  调度博弈    收益分配    海运物流
收稿时间:2009-9-16

Sequence Game Considering the Coalition of Carrier and Shippers
SONG Peng,CHEN Feng.Sequence Game Considering the Coalition of Carrier and Shippers[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2010,44(12):1682-1686.
Authors:SONG Peng  CHEN Feng
Institution:(Department of Industrial Engineering and Logistics Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China)
Abstract:This paper studied the sequence game considering the coalition of carrier and shippers. The time cost of shippers and the transportation cost of carrier were analyzed. Then, the cooperative game model of shippers and carrier was built. Moreover, a division rule of cost savings was raised. Finally, an example was given to show the method.
Keywords:sequencing game  revenue division rule  ocean shipping
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