| 对流密码算法LEX的差分故障攻击 |
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| 引用本文： | 张中亚,关杰. 对流密码算法LEX的差分故障攻击[J]. 上海交通大学学报, 2012, 46(6): 865-869 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张中亚 关杰 |
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| 作者单位： | (信息工程大学 电子技术学院，郑州 450004) |
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| 基金项目： | 通信保密重点实验室基金资助项目(9140C110202110C1101) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于面向比特随机故障模型对流密码算法LEX(Leak EXtraction)进行了差分故障攻击，得出：需要96对正误输出密钥流和232次计算或120对正误输出密钥流和216次计算可完全恢复128 bit初始密钥.结果显示LEX对差分故障攻击是不安全的.
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| 关 键 词： | 流密码 差分故障分析 Leak Extraction(LEX) |
| 收稿时间： | 2011-09-08 |
Differential Fault Analysis on the Stream Cipher LEX |
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| ZHANG Zhong-ya,GUAN Jie. Differential Fault Analysis on the Stream Cipher LEX[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2012, 46(6): 865-869 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Zhong-ya GUAN Jie |
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| Affiliation: | (Electronic Technology Institute, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450004, China) |
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| Abstract: | A differential fault analysis on stream cipher LEX (Leak Extraction) based on bit-oriented random fault model is shows that it needs about 96 pairs of correct and faulty key stream and 232 simple operations or 120 pairs of correct and faulty key-stream and 216 simple operations to recover all the 128 bit master key. The result shows that LEX is vulnerable to differential fault analysis. |
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| Keywords: | stream cipher differential fault analysis leak EXtraction(LEX) |
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