闭环供应链中制造商渠道进入策略

考虑了由制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链，通过在制造商与零售商回收模式下分别建立制造商不引入与引入直销渠道行为下的闭环供应链博弈模型，分析了制造商的渠道进入决策产生的相关影响。研究发现：当通过直销渠道销售的成本低于一定的临界值时，制造商选择引入直销渠道；制造商的渠道进入始终对自身及消费者有利，对零售商及环保不利。制造商回收模式下，当直销渠道成本低于一定的临界值时，制造商渠道进入对闭环供应链系统有利；而零售商回收模式下制造商渠道进入始终对系统不利。制造商回收模式下制造商更偏好于选择引入直销渠道，零售商回收模式下制造商渠道进入策略与回收转移支付价格相关。最后，运用算例分析了回收模式与制造商渠道进入对闭环供应链利润、消费者剩余、环境绩效和社会福利的联合影响。

Manufacturer Encroachment in Closed-Loop Supply Chains

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain is considered which consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing closed-loop supply chain decision-making models with and without manufacturer encroachment under manufacturer-and retailer-collecting schemes, the manufacturer’s optimal channel entry strategy and its supply chain consequences are analyzed. The main findings demonstrate that the manufacturer introduces the direct channel if the marginal cost of the direct channel is lower than a threshold, and the channel entry always benefits the manufacturer and consumers but does no good to the retailer and environment. In addition, in the manufacturer-collecting scheme, there exists a threshold in direct channel cost, below which the channel entry is beneficial to the whole chain system; however, the channel entry always harms the channel system in the retailer-collecting scheme. Moreover, the manufacturer prefers to introduce direct channel in the manufacturer-collecting scheme, while the manufacturer’s channel entry decision hinges on the transfer price of the used product paid to the retailer in the retailer-collecting scheme. Finally, numerical examples are utilized to analyze the joint effects of the collecting schemes and manufacturer’s channel entry behavior on channel profits, consumer surplus, environment performance, and social welfare.